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2About This Initiative
Verité gratefully acknowledges the support of Humanity United in conducting this initiative.
Verité’s HELP WANTED initiative – a research and advocacy effort described in this report – aims to clarify and publicize the ways in which 
current labor broker practices can create hiring traps; and to provide concrete approaches by which private sector, civil society, and govern-
mental institutions can address this key point of leverage to reduce the risk of a worker ending up a victim of modern-day slavery.
Labor brokers – middlemen in the recruitment, hiring and/or management of laborers – operate at the core of the global economy. Complex 
supply chains necessitate levels of coordination and expertise that are not easily found within a given company because the challenges are 
spread out over multiple countries and time zones, and workforces are in many instances comprised of workers from far-flung lands. Com-
panies turn to labor brokers to manage many of these challenges, but the increasing use of labor brokers brings with it troubling issues of 
fragmented and opaque social accountability. For workers, labor brokerage increases migration and job acquisition costs and the risk of 
serious exploitation, including slavery. 
Verité is a global advocate for workers. Through our understanding of the perspectives of workers, we find solutions to human rights viola-
tions in good business practices. We work to remove dangers and abuses in workplaces around the world by providing knowledge, skills 
and tools to workers, employers, multinational companies, NGOs, trade unions, investors and governments.
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4Workers are at heightened vulnerability to modern-day slavery when they have been brought 
to work away from their homes. This vulnerability is generated or exacerbated by the in-
volvement of labor brokers. Labor brokers act as the middlemen, facilitating a connection 
between potential workers and their eventual employers.
The system of labor brokerage is widespread, opaque, sometimes corrupt, and largely lack-
ing in accountability. In some cases brokerages are substantial, well-organized companies. 
In others they are informal in their structure and outreach. In all cases their presence in the 
recruitment and hiring “supply chain” increases the vulnerability of migrant workers to vari-
ous forms of forced labor once on-the-job. The debt that is often necessary for migrant 
workers to undertake in order to pay recruitment fees, when combined with the deception 
that is visited upon them by brokers about job types and salaries, can lead to a situation of 
debt-bondage – which, according to Anti-Slavery International, is “probably the least known 
form of slavery today, and yet it is the most widely used method of enslaving people.”1
When a migrant worker finds herself in a foreign country, with formidable recruitment debt and 
possibly even ancestral family land hanging in the balance, on a work visa that ties her to one 
employer and a job that doesn’t remotely resemble the salary and conditions that were prom-
ised to her by her labor broker, she has fallen into what Verité calls a HIRING TRAP. There are 
few global workplace problems in more urgent need of attention.
This report begins by offering key findings from recent Verité research on the intersection of 
brokers, migrant workers and slavery. This research was performed in a variety of sectors 
and locales across the globe, including: the migration of adults from India to the Gulf Coop-
eration Council (GCC) States of the Middle East for work in construction, infrastructure and 
the service sector; the migration of children and juveniles from the Indian interior to domes-
tic apparel production hubs; the migration of adults from Guatemala, Mexico and Thailand 
to work in U.S. agriculture; and the migration of adults from the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Nepal to the Information Technology sector in Malaysia and Taiwan.
This report then presents the factors that, in Verité’s view, constitute the major red flags for 
vulnerability of migrant workers to broker-induced forced labor. These red flags were present 
individually or in various combinations across all the sectors and locales of Verité’s research. 
A set of concrete activities and engagements to promote the fair hiring of migrant workers is 
offered at the close of the report.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
5Juvenile Migrant Workers in India-Based Domestic 
Garment Manufacturing
 •The trafficking of adolescent girls into indentured servitude in apparel manufacturing in 
   Tirupur is commonplace, under a system known locally as the “Sumangali Scheme.”
 •Girls aged 14 to 17 years are recruited to work far from home for three years, in return for  
   a lump-sum payment of around US$750 at the end of the three-year contract.
 •“Sumangali” girls commonly work 12 to 15 hour shifts and sometimes even 24-hour
   shifts. They are exposed to hazardous chemicals and other occupational hazards, and    
   kept largely isolated from their families and the outside world. 
 •Brokers recruit girls into the system using deception and obfuscation about job 
   conditions, living conditions and salary.
 •The system of brokerage is remarkably informal, with brokers oftentimes recruiting girls as  
   a part-time job while working full-time as factory workers themselves. 
 •The Sumangali scheme is well-known in the region, and yet the practice continues 
   unabated. Poverty, indebtedness, alcoholism, lack of employment opportunities for 
   mature adult workers, and cultural attitudes toward the girl child are all factors that 
   combine to create a situation in which such extreme exploitation goes largely unchecked.
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6Indian Migrant Workers in Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) States
 •Keralite workers seeking employment in GCC States are highly vulnerable to slavery once  
  they arrive in the host country. 
 •While there is a legal ceiling on recruitment fees in India, this ceiling is not enforced, and   
  rogue recruitment agencies operate with practical impunity.
 •Brokers regularly misrepresent the terms and conditions of jobs, thus creating a situation  
  in which a worker incurs large recruitment debt expecting a certain level of income but is in  
  actuality paid much less. 
 •Fraudulent recruitment practices were found to be an issue of concern, including the use  
  of false visas and work permits, as well as charging workers for jobs in the host country   
  that do not exist.
Once on-site in GCC States, workers frequently find themselves trapped: by debt incurred 
at home that they must pay off, by visa and work permit regulations that bind them to a par-
ticular workplace, by unsympathetic host country law enforcement that is more interested in 
“busting” migrant workers whose paperwork is not in order than in protecting and defending 
their labor and human rights, and in some cases by their illegal status brought upon them by 
no fault of their own. 
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7Philippine, Indonesian and Nepalese Migrant 
Workers in IT Manufacturing in Malaysia and Taiwan
 •Migrant workers bound for work in IT factories in Taiwan and Malaysia frequently pay   
   recruitment fees in excess of legal limits. In Malaysia, Verité research indicates that sub  
   contracted workers (as opposed to direct-hire workers) are at particular risk in this regard.
 
 •Brokers do not disclose the actual full amount of fees until late in the recruitment phase.   
    Workers are instructed to present documents to immigration authorities that do not reflect 
   the actual amounts paid. 
 •Almost all workers interviewed by Verité did not have the financial means to fund 
   placement fees and thus had to resort to taking out loans, many with onerous financing   
   schemes. 
 •Labor brokers and employers regularly engage in contract substitution, whereby the terms  
   of employment are changed over the course of the recruitment and hiring process. 
   Additional fees charged by brokers in receiving countries, as well as deductions for 
   anti-runaway insurance/forced savings, further compound the financial burden of workers.  
   Once employed, workers are obliged to work overtime in order to repay their debts. 
 •Freedom of movement is curtailed through the withholding of passports, the requirement  
   to put up a deposit for temporary emergency trips home, and the requirement that
   workers must pay their own return airfare and pay any recruitment debt in full if they wish  
   to terminate their contract early. 
 •In Malaysia, workers are tied to their jobs by the law, which obligates them to remain with  
   their sponsoring employer or become undocumented. 
 •There is evidence that the high recruitment fees borne by workers are in some cases a 
   subsidy to their eventual employers. In Taiwan, many brokers provide their services to      
   employers “free of charge” but require high fees of workers. 
 •Brokers, too, operate in a challenging environment, as many are asked by employers to   
   fulfill job orders within two weeks, and to provide a pool of applicants 300 percent above  
   the actual manpower need. 
8Guatemalan, Mexican and Thai Migrant Workers in 
the U.S. Agricultural Sector
 •Forced labor is a well-known phenomenon in agriculture in the United States, and labor 
   brokers are key actors in the system, both for documented and undocumented workers. 
 •The primary mechanism for entrapping workers in situations of forced labor in U.S. 
   agriculture is the facilitation of grave indebtedness prior to arrival in the United States:    
    Verité found evidence of brokerage fees ranging from a few hundred dollars to US   
    $25,000 among undocumented workers and workers on H2A and H2B 
   guestworker visas.
 
 •Interest rates can be usurious, reaching up to 20 percent monthly. Brokers or 
   moneylenders affiliated with brokers sometimes hold workers’ titles to land or other 
   valuables as collateral. 
 •Once in the United States, workers can be threatened with deportation, blacklisting, con  
   fiscation of land, and violence against themselves and their families if they complain. 
 •The brokers themselves can be large or small, and there appears to be no direct correla  
   tion between forced labor and the size or legal status of the broker. 
 •A worker whose labor broker directly finances his/her recruitment and travel to the work  
   site is at high risk of forced labor. 
 •Verité found that workers on guestworker visas were at high risk of vulnerability to forced  
   labor. 
 •Provisions of the U.S. guestworker visa program introduce risks of forced labor by:
• making it practically impossible for migrant workers to “walk away” from 
  abusive employers; 
• allowing for wages below the legal minimum 2
• failing to consider the seasonal nature of agricultural, forestry and herding jobs, which  
  translates into idle periods during the work season when workers earn no money; 
• supporting the geographic and cultural isolation of workers and 
• making workers unlikely to complain or speak to outsiders due to fear of deportation.
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9This report identifies common patterns, behaviors and conditions found by Verité to make 
migrant workers more vulnerable to exploitation and slavery. Verité characterizes these com-
monalities as red flags for all stakeholders, as they were are found in various combinations 
across all the sectors and locales of Verité’s research. 
These flags, or indicators, fall into three categories: 
WHAT TO
LOOK FOR:
RED FLAGS FOR 
VULNERABILITY TO 
BROKER-INDUCED
FORCED LABOR
1) Setting the Stage. These factors refer to preexisting conditions within the workplace  
   and in the hiring process that create vulnerabilities to forced labor; for example, the 
   outsourcing of recruitment, hiring, and/or management of migrant workers to labor  
   brokers, or the use of restrictive visa programs.
2) Traps in Recruitment and Hiring (or “The Bait”). This refers to the deceiving of   
    workers prior to employment, as well as the facilitation of indebtedness in recruit  
    ment. Deception could include misinformation about anything from pay and benefits  
    to fraudulent visa practices. 
3) Employment Traps (or “The Switch”). This refers to conditions that bind within the   
    job; for example, when workers’ passports or pay are withheld from them.
These red flags represent a solid entry point for efforts to detect hiring traps and remedi-
ate them, ultimately paving the way for fair hiring for migrant workers in the global econ-
omy. When one or more of these risk factors identified by Verité is present in the employ-
ment lifecycle, investigation into the possibility of forced labor is needed.
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Action to Promote the Fair Hiring of Migrant Workers 
in the Global Economy
This research will serve as a platform from which Verité’s Help Wanted initiative will engage 
with a broad range of stakeholders to promote fair hiring for migrant workers. In the upcom-
ing months, Verité will develop a set of tools to detect and remediate hiring traps, articulate 
key policy challenges to the protection of migrant workers in recruitment and hiring, host 
workshops and other venues worldwide to present and discuss these tools and policy solu-
tions, and maintain a website clearinghouse of resources on the protection of migrant work-
ers in recruitment and hiring. 
This report is the product of Phase I of a multiphase Verité initiative that aims to clarify, publi-
cize, and reduce the risks of exploitation associated with global labor broker practices.
Phase II of the project will provide concrete approaches for the private sector, civil society, 
government institutions, and investors to address key leverage points and reduce the inci-
dence of modern-day slavery. These approaches will include a primer, toolkit and policy brief 
on the intersections between labor brokerage, human trafficking and forced labor. Sign up 
on our webpage to receive updates on project outputs and activities.
THE WAY
FORWARD
Phase I: 
Examine, identify, clarify role of labor brokers in forced labor
Phase II: 
Tools and recommendations to companies, NGO’s, 
auditors, governments, investors, and advocates
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The current report provides a synopsis and key findings from Verité’s longstanding research 
and action on the vulnerabilities to forced labor faced by migrant workers. In particular 
we highlight the findings from a 2009 year-long research effort – associated with our Help 
Wanted research and advocacy campaign – that examined the role and key characteristics 
of labor brokerage across a range of sectors, business types, and regions. Verité interviewed 
migrant workers, employers, brokers, government representatives, and worker advocates. 
This research identified where labor brokerage most frequently leads to forced labor, and 
clarified the nature of the risk of forced labor that can be linked to the role of labor brokers in 
recruitment and hiring. 
Verité performed research in a number of settings to understand the circumstances and 
settings under which workers may be subjected to conditions of forced labor through labor 
brokers, including the recruitment of Philippine workers bound for jobs in IT manufacturing 
in Taiwan, the trafficking of adolescent girls in rural India into the domestic textile industry, 
and smuggling and employment of undocumented Mexican immigrants on U.S. vegetable 
farms. Verité conducted extensive interviews with workers, brokers, and labor advocates in 
Guatemala, Mexico, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, India, and the U.S. using structured 
questionnaires as well as more in-depth case studies. 
In addition to the abovementioned three reports, Verité also draws here on our research into 
the trafficking of Philippine males into the maritime, construction and agriculture sectors in the 
Southeast Asia region; our work on the verification of working conditions on cocoa farms in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana; and research currently underway on forced labor in Latin America, 
Africa and Asia in a wide range of agricultural, fishing and aquaculture supply chains. 
Rounding out Verité’s understanding of the intersection between outsourced recruitment 
and hiring, human trafficking, and forced labor is our experience through thousands of social 
audits and interviews with tens of thousands of workers – many of them migrant workers.
The results of this initiative add to the growing body of knowledge on different aspects of 
human trafficking and forced labor conducted by various organizations, including the Inter-
national Labor Organization, the International Organization for Migration, the United Na-
tions Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, the International Confederation of Private 
Employment Agencies (CIETT), the U.S. State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking in Persons, the Institute for Human Rights and Business, the International Busi-
ness Leaders Forum, Anti-Slavery International, Free the Slaves, and the Coalition to Abolish 
Slavery and Trafficking, Business for Social Responsibility, and many others. 
VERITÉ RESEARCH
PROCESS 
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Slavery is alive and well in our modern-day world, and it isn’t always or necessarily hidden 
away in distant locales. or ONLY embedded in local goods and markets. There is a good 
chance that slavery is a part of your daily life, in the things you buy, or the services you re-
ceive. An estimated 12 to 27 million people are victims of slavery and other forms of forced 
labor around the world. 3 In the United States alone, 10,000 or more people are being 
forced to work at any given time. 4
Why is slavery still thriving? Part of the answer is that, with globalization has come not only a 
rapid increase in the flows of workers across borders, but also an increase in opportunities 
to exploit these migrant workers. One of the darkest of these forms of exploitation is human 
trafficking. 5 And when a human being is trafficked for the purposes of forced labor, the re-
sult is a form of modern-day slavery. More than 2.4 million victims of forced labor have been 
trafficked, 6 and 161 countries are either a source, transit, or destination country for the 
trafficking of human beings. 7 Trafficking can take many different forms, ranging from forced 
kidnapping for prostitution to illegal recruitment schemes for factory-based work. Contrary 
to common perception, it is not always easy to identify a situation of human trafficking. While 
migration for work may appear voluntary and even legal, the worker is often trapped in a job 
she cannot leave.
One of the key pieces of this human trafficking puzzle is the marked rise – across the globe, 
in a wide range of sectors and services – of the subcontracting of recruitment and hiring for 
migrant laborers. These recruitment and hiring functions are subcontracted to labor brokers 
variously referred to, among other terms, as labor intermediaries, middlemen, recruiters, 
farm labor contractors, and jobbers. 
These labor brokers take on one or more functions along the recruitment and hiring supply 
chain, such as matching aspiring migrant workers with jobs of all sorts across the globe. In 
the process, labor brokers take responsibility for visas, medical checkups, travel arrange-
ments, pre-departure orientation and training, and even contract negotiation. In some cases, 
these labor brokers also go on to manage the labor of the migrant contract workers at the 
job sites; in effect they act as the on-site supervisor of the worker.
While such brokers often play a legitimate – and perhaps indispensible – role in the smooth 
and efficient operation of global supply chain production, their presence also creates or ex-
acerbates vulnerabilities to forced labor for migrant workers. When outsourced recruitment 
and hiring goes awry, the result in many cases is debt-bondage. 
INTRODUCTION
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In a labor broker-worker relationship, terms of the work, and the responsibility of the labor 
broker to the worker after the worker is on the job, are poorly defined and poorly under-
stood. Big recruitment fees – sometimes legal, sometimes illegal – are often charged to the 
worker to obtain the job overseas. The worker might borrow money to pay the fees, wager-
ing that the debt will be easy to pay off. But what if the terms of work – especially pay – wind 
up being less favorable than what the labor broker promised? Once a worker is on-site at 
the foreign workplace – with a big loan and attendant interest payments like a weight on her 
back and a work visa that ties her to one workplace – it is difficult, if not impossible, to escape. 
Verité calls this phenomenon the hiring trap, and there are few global workplace problems in 
more urgent need of attention.
Aspirations abroad
 •A worker has difficulty findings decent wages in her community.
 •She sees many of her peers earn money abroad
 •She seeks out a recruiter to help her find work  elsewhere
The labor broker
 •The recruiter charges her for placement, travel, and visa
 •The fees are exorbitant - some are legal and some are not
 •She borrows money, acquiring debt
 •Terms of work seem unclear
Debt on-the-job
 •She travels to the foreign workplace
 •She is paid less the she was promised
 •She is forced to work overtime
 •Her loans mean she cannot escape
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In what follows, this report first discusses the role of labor brokers in the global economy and 
how their presence can create hiring traps for migrant workers. Specific examples are offered 
of the broker–trap link from Verité’s research, as well as the conclusions that emerged from 
our study.
The report then highlights, in Verité’s view, the key red flags of the risk of human trafficking in 
recruitment and hiring and of forced labor at the workplace. These red flags represent a sub-
stantial entry point for the detection and remediation of hiring traps, and the establishment of 
fair hiring guidelines, for migrant workers in the global economy. 
The report concludes by presenting upcoming additional contributions from Verité toward 
fair hiring and an articulation of actionable first steps that can be taken by concerned stake-
holders to join this effort.
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SECTION I 
LABOR BROKERS AND HIRING TRAPS 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
VERITÉ RESEARCH FINDINGS
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Labor Brokers-Their Roles and Functions in 
Creating Hiring Traps
Labor brokers operate at the core of the global economy. Complex supply chains neces-
sitate levels of coordination and expertise that are not easily found within a given company 
because the challenges are spread out over multiple countries and time zones, and work-
forces are in many instances comprised of migrant workers from far-flung lands. Companies 
turn to labor brokers to manage many of these challenges. Labor brokers are especially 
sought in sectors where there is a seasonal demand for workers, in situations where work-
ers and employers do not speak a common language, or where aspiring workers need to 
travel long distances (and across borders) to reach the job site. 
Jobseekers, in turn, look to labor brokers to help navigate the complex waters of migration 
for employment abroad. And with the population of international migrants having doubled 
since 1965 (to nearly 200 million), the services of labor brokers have become increasingly 
sought: The International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies reports that over 
9.5 million workers use private agencies to find jobs. 8 Brokerage agencies assist the major-
ity of jobseekers migrating from Asian countries, especially from the Philippines, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka. 9 In 1997, private agencies facilitated 80 percent of all labor migration from 
Asia to the Arab States. 10 
Labor brokers run the gamut from an individual working informally through personal net-
works to large, formal businesses with global outreach. The start-up costs for becoming a 
labor broker are low 11, and there is very little regulation of labor brokers, even in the indus-
trialized world. Brokers therefore are often left to operate in a grey area where applicability of 
worker protections to their activities is unclear at best and nonexistent at worst. 
Labor brokers charge workers for their job-matching and placement services, sometimes 
excessively. But even legally permitted fees paid to brokers can impoverish workers and 
make them vulnerable to exploitation. Research has shown that lower-skilled migrants tend 
to pay a higher percentage of job-matching fees than do higher-skilled workers. 12 In turn, 
these workers are less able to bargain for higher wages and better working conditions once 
on-the-job.
 
VERITÉ RESEARCH
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In all cases the presence of labor brokers raises the cost to the worker of migration and 
compromises transparency in hiring and employment: Because the worker is not negotiating 
directly with the employer, the worker suffers from “imperfect information” about his or her 
eventual working conditions. 13As Verité’s research shows, formal brokerages often oper-
ate outside the law, charging illegally high placement fees and playing upon the “information 
gap” by actively deceiving workers regarding their conditions of work. 
The results from Verité’s research help to provide concrete examples of why brokers have 
become so essential, and how their presence creates vulnerability to human trafficking and 
forced labor – in other words, how hiring traps happen. While the sets of circumstances that 
led to slavery for each trafficking victim interviewed by Verité were unique, two key ingredi-
ents were present in the majority of cases: debt and deception. 
The employment lifecycle almost always takes the shape of a bait and switch scheme, in 
which an attractive job is offered to the aspiring migrant/job-seeker at a high price. The job-
seeker thinks the cost is worth it, given what is being offered. But the real job turns out to be 
much different, and the worker is saddled with debt that acts as a bond to the workplace. 
Labor brokers – whether intentionally or by happenstance – are almost always the root 
cause of the debt, the deception and therefore bait. 
Employers – again either purposefully or inadvertently – flip the switch by rolling out a job 
that pays less than what the broker had promised the migrant worker. Employers oftentimes 
reinforce the migrant worker’s “bond” to the workplace through other means, such as with-
holding passports, levying deductions and withholdings that further diminish the worker’s 
take-home pay and ability to pay off debt, taking control of bank accounts, placing the 
worker in physical or social isolation, and subjecting the worker to threats of deportation 
and/or physical or verbal abuse. 
An understanding of the legitimate roles played by brokers in various locales worldwide, 
along with the vulnerabilities to forced labor that are in many cases created by these bro-
kers, is an essential place to begin when seeking to provide better protections for migrant 
workers in the global economy. 
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Labor Brokers and Hiring Traps in Tirupur, India 
In the Indian garment manufacturing hub of Tirupur, Tamil Nadu, there are vast networks of 
factories and subcontractors, with units ranging in size from individual home-based units to 
factories with over 1000 workers. This multitude of manufacturing facilities of all shapes and 
sizes has developed in part as larger factories cleave themselves to avoid falling within the 
confines of labor legislation, and in part as a response to global market pressures for flexible 
and infinitely expandable and contractible production capacity. A multitude of small, individ-
ual units can be highly flexible and responsive to market demand, since each small factory 
unit relates with the tiers above and below on a strictly contract basis. This sort of system 
necessitates a high degree of coordination, particularly where workforces are concerned. 
This is where the role of the labor broker becomes essential.
Labor brokers in Tirupur perform a range of functions, including recruitment and manage-
ment of subsets of “contract” workers on-site at bigger factories. Where recruitment is con-
cerned, they help to answer the growing demand for adolescent girl workers from India’s ru-
ral and impoverished interior, who work on three-year contracts under which the bulk of their 
salary is withheld until the contract is fulfilled. This system is known locally as the “Sumangali 
Scheme”. Sumangali brokers enable a “spider’s web” of imperfect information, convincing 
impoverished and desperate parents of the benefits of factory employment – such as food 
and housing and a steady job where the girl is learning a skill – while intentionally withholding 
information about the physical stresses and dangers of the job. 
Once on-the-job, the girls find themselves trapped: their movement is strictly confined, and 
conversations with their parents are monitored. They are forced to work long hours and in 
some cases are subject to grave occupational hazards such as repeated exposure to toxic 
chemicals. If they complain, they are threatened with immediate dismissal and forfeiture of 
their salary, which has been accruing toward the lump-sum payment. ASK-Verité (our part-
nership in India) found troubling evidence that, in some cases, girls are trafficked twice: first 
for labor exploitation and then for sexual exploitation.
VERITÉ RESEARCH
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Even once parents become aware of the true conditions of these garment factory jobs, 
ASK-Verité research found they do not typically complain or attempt to withdraw their 
daughters from the work. Some parents described to ASK-Verité that they felt it would be 
no use to complain, or that they were caught in a situation where they were heavily depend-
ing on the lump-sum payout at the end of the contract, or that they did not want to make 
trouble for themselves and jeopardize future earning opportunities. 
Case Study
Shyam: A Broker of “Sumangali Girls” 
Shyam is 30 years old. He is married with two sons. He is from a village approximately 130 
miles from Tirupur. Shyam supplements his income as a worker at a garment factory in Tiru-
pur with part-time work as a labor broker for his factory and other facilities nearby. Shyam is 
part of a network of 15 other brokers, each known to each other through their factory jobs 
or personal relationships. Shyam’s network has supplied garment sector factories in Tirupur 
with approximately 2000 Sumangali girls in the past four years. Shyam himself has provided 
100 girls in the past year alone, for spinning and knitting mills. For each girl he supplies, 
Shyam is paid US$53.70; US$21.50 of which is earmarked to pay bribes to religious and 
political leaders in the villages from which the girls originate. Shyam said there is “nothing 
special” about the way that Sumangali girls are treated. Shyam himself is employed under 
many of the same conditions as the Sumangali girls, facing long shifts with constant verbal 
harassment and abuse. Whoever wants to earn money must “get used” to these working 
conditions, he said; and the only difference between him and the Sumangali girls is that he 
gets paid regularly, whereas as Sumangali girls are paid only once at the end of their (typical-
ly three-year) contract. Shyam feels he is doing these girls a service. He said that he became 
involved in labor brokerage to make “quick money,” and that if he does not supply the girls, 
somebody else will.
Shyam feels he is doing these girls a ser-
vice. He said that he became involved in 
labor brokerage to make “quick money,” 
and that if he does not supply the girls, 
somebody else will.
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Case Study: Rani
Escaping from the Sumangali Scheme 
As a Sumangali girl, Rani was placed in a job in a spinning mill. Rani’s duties involved chemi-
cal washing and bleaching, and her skin was exposed to the chemicals as she worked. 
Working with these chemicals was required, and she was not provided with any protective 
equipment. Rani developed burns on her hands and neck. Other girls working in the bleach-
ing area suffered similar burns. Contrary to the claims of Rani’s labor broker, the factory did 
not bear all medical expenses for the girls working in the facility: Medical expenses up to 
US$4.33 were paid by the factory. Any expenses in excess of US$4.33 were deducted from 
the girls’ salaries. 
After working at the mill for two years, the situation became unbearable and Rani fled home. 
Her parents were unhappy with her decision and scolded her for not completing her three 
year contract, since this meant that she forfeited her entire lump-sum salary of US$757. 
Rani’s parents have not spoken of her experience in the Sumangali scheme with other 
parents or villagers, as they are afraid to cause trouble. For the same reason, they have not 
confronted the labor broker, who is not currently recruiting in the area but is still seen in the 
village. Rani’s neck and hands are permanently scarred from her experience in the mill. 
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Brokers and Hiring Traps Among Indian Workers in 
Gulf Countries
Both formal and informal labor brokers play prominent roles in out-migration from the In-
dian state of Kerala for employment in the Gulf countries of the Middle East. Formal, regis-
tered brokerage agencies are of various sizes. Informal brokers hail from networks of family, 
friends and acquaintances. 
ASK-Verité’s research found that both formal and informal brokers exploit the jobseeker. Use 
of a formal brokerage agency almost always entailed high fees – up to US$4100 – and the 
attendant vulnerabilities to de-facto debt bondage once on-site. While use of informal net-
works tended to be a cheaper route, it was not without risks. Workers going through infor-
mal networks sometimes migrated on tourist visas and then networked their way into a job 
and a formal work visa once in the Middle East. But this strategy was not always successful; 
and in some cases, visa paperwork was not in order and the jobseeker landed in jail. Formal 
brokerages were also guilty of providing false visas in some cases. An astonishing 20 per-
cent of workers interviewed by ASK-Verité in Kerala had spent time in jail while jobseeking 
or working in the Middle East, due to problems related to visas and work permits. Length of 
incarceration ranged from one to eight months. 14
Once in the Gulf countries, workers were subjected to routine rights violations by employ-
ers. Leveraging the threat of deportation, employers forced workers to accept poor working 
conditions and contract violations. Freedom of movement was severely restricted, primarily 
because workers were required to provide their passports to employers to receive a work 
permit: In the case of the United Arab Emirates, one hundred percent of workers surveyed 
by ASK-Verité had their passports withheld. 
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Case study: Hrishi
Forced Labor in Dubai
Hrishi, 30, is a former jewelry store owner from Talecherry in Kannur district. Almost all the 
families in his village have two to three family members working in the GCC States, and have 
large houses to show for it. In the Kannur district, workers often go to the GCC States with 
a “free visa”, wherein they can work a range of jobs once they arrive. Hrishi still had debts 
from the closure of his jewelry store, and decided to go to Dubai. He paid a recruiting agen-
cy US$2,813 for his visa, airline ticket and free visa. Hrishi took out a bank loan to pay the 
recruiting fee, and left for Dubai. Upon arrival, no one was there to greet him and he could 
not get through to the recruiting agency in India. A stranger came up to him in the airport 
and said he was an agent who could find Hrishi a job. He was taken to a room in a base-
ment with about 50 other people who had similar stories. When Hrishi tried to leave, he was 
forcibly restrained, his passport taken and made to work odd jobs for around US$65 per 
month. Hrishi also endured physical and emotional abuse. After six months, while working 
at a supermarket, Hrishi escaped and a friend who worked in a shipping company helped 
him get back to India. When he returned, he tried to get his money back from the recruit-
ment agency to no avail. Hrishi currently works in a jewelry store in Kerala and still has debts 
incurred from his disastrous trip to Dubai. He hopes to go to Dubai soon through a reputable 
recruiting agency so he can pay back the money he owes.
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Brokers and International Economic Trends
In domestic garment production, the many small production units under study exemplified the 
use of contract labor (and unscrupulous labor brokerage) at its extreme, driven by complex 
supply chains, buyer demands for rock-bottom prices, and laws favoring small, informal pro-
duction units. The trend toward contract labor was echoed in the Gulf countries, where adult 
migrants were paid significantly less than host-country natives. Case studies such as the ones 
featured in this report should be used by stakeholders to advocate for improvement of the 
conditions under which Indian migrant workers are employed at home and abroad. 
The Many Faces of Forced Labor
Verité’s research in India illustrates the diverse ways in which workers can fall victim to 
broker-induced forced labor. Sumangali girls are drawn into forced labor not with advances, 
but with promises of payments to come. Keralite workers, though in debt due to recruit-
ment fees, could not technically be considered bonded as they received loans from banks or 
other lenders, and not brokers or employers; nonetheless, the debt hanging over them was 
certainly a major “menace” preventing them from escaping forced labor. Working outside 
their country, language, and culture, indebted, abused and isolated, these Keralite workers 
in the Gulf certainly suffered the largest concurrence of vulnerabilities to forced labor. Stricter 
and more robust regulation and enforcement of labor brokers is in order, as well as a review 
of the effectiveness of current laws on forced labor, and bonded labor in particular. Reme-
diation efforts should address not only poverty-alleviation but should also aim to provide 
training in source communities to balance the disparate availability of information between 
workers and brokers that contributed to forced labor. 
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The Differing Roles of Brokers
In a certain sense, “the” labor broker in India does not exist. Brokers may act as job con-
tractors or labor contractors, including as recruiters, agents, supervisors. These roles are 
not mutually exclusive and may occur at the national or international level. In addition, within 
India, workers may act as brokers and brokers may take on the responsibilities of employ-
ers, blurring the traditional employer-employee relationship further still. 
Above all, the heterogeneity of findings points to the need to consider the discrete roles of 
brokers when designing policy or remediation initiatives. Legal provisions such as the Con-
tract Labor Act should be reviewed to ensure that they reflect these many roles. More robust 
protection for small-scale work units should be explored. 
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Brokers and Hiring Traps in Malaysia and Taiwan
There is no industry more dynamic and global than that of electrical and electronics manu-
facturing, and thus it served as an excellent sector of focus for Verité in examining the role 
of labor brokers in supply chain production. The industry is typified by intense competition 
among manufacturers and tight interdependencies among the various countries and locales 
where product design, assembly, and manufacture take place. 
Verité’s research took place in Taiwan and Malaysia, both of which are production and manu-
facturing hubs that play critical roles in the supply chains of leading brand names. The elec-
tronics industry manpower base in both Taiwan and Malaysia is made up largely of migrant 
workers from neighboring Asian countries. Taiwan, in particular, has become the biggest sup-
ply partner of the world’s major industry players, and is fast becoming its largest employer. 
In both Taiwan and Malaysia, labor brokers play substantial roles in the supply of the in-
dustry’s labor force requirements, and labor brokerage is big business. Employers rely on 
labor brokers to recruit, hire and manage their migrant workforces. In Taiwan, employers 
and brokers alike told Verité that only brokers are able to get work visas and quotas issued 
in a timely manner; employers lack the necessary relationships with government officials. In 
Taiwan, many brokers do not charge employers at all, while jobseekers pay high recruitment 
fees. In this way, the jobseeker is subsidizing her future employer. 
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Employers make very stringent demands on brokers, requiring them to fulfill job orders for 
migrant laborers in two weeks to a month’s time. Employers require a pool of applicants 
from which to choose that constitutes 300 percent of the actual manpower needed. In order 
to respond to such demands, competing brokers have had to come up with strategies and 
have established practices that often circumvent legal, or industry code standard regula-
tions. Brokers advertise the jobs by promising high wages, and superior work and living 
conditions, in order to attract as many applicants as they can to fulfill manpower pooling 
requirements. Some brokers also claim that employers expect to be treated to “full service” 
including air transportation, hotel accommodations, and other related services; the cost of 
which is often passed on to applicants and recruits. 
Verité research has found that Philippine, Indonesian, and Nepalese workers bound for work 
in IT factories in Taiwan and Malaysia frequently pay recruitment fees in excess of legal limits. 
In Malaysia, Verité research indicates that subcontracted workers (as opposed to direct-hire 
workers) are at particular risk in this regard. 
Almost all workers interviewed by Verité for this research did not have the financial means to 
fund placement fees and thus had to resort to making loans, under which many were sub-
jected to onerous financing schemes. The terms of payment demanded by lenders, many of 
whom are associated with the brokers, can and do place workers in situations of highly lever-
aged debt. Additional fees charged by brokers in the receiving countries further compound the 
financial burden of workers. Once employed, workers need to work overtime in order to repay 
their debts, and send money for their families who rely on their monthly remittances. 
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Case Study:
Example of Overcharging by a Philippine Broker
G Placement is the counterpart agency of the Taiwan broker DM. G Placement is a government-
accredited agency, and considered one of the largest, in terms of rate of deployments. In a press 
release issued by the POEA, G Placement was cited as one of the top performing agencies for 
2006. G Placement usually places ads and notices in local media, participates in provincial job fairs, 
and has representatives in Cebu City and other major Visayan Regions. Most applicants/ workers 
(interviewed by Verité in 2008 and 2009) who secured their Taiwan job through G Placement said 
that they had responded to ads, while others were given referrals by family and friends or heard of 
G Placement through job fairs. 
Even though G Placement was singled out by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) 
as a Top Performer, the amounts paid by the workers above far exceeded the legally allowed 
fee, which should have been around US$544. Instead the fees paid by the workers to G Place-
ment ranged from US$1,632 to US$2,437. The examples below provide a sense of the types and 
amounts of fees charged by G Placement.
Sample 1 (according to a worker who renewed his application and contract): In 2003
  Broker fee: US$1,305
  Medical check: US$73
  One-way ticket: US$239
  Jacket: US$6.53
  Visa application: US$44
  TOTAL: US$1645
In 2006
  Broker: US$2,067 – paid in two installments
  Jacket: US$13
  Rush renewal application: US$44
  TOTAL: US$2124
Sample 2 (according to first-time applicants):
  Broker (all-in 15): US$1,958 to 2,067
  Service fee to Third Party: US$218 to US$261
  Medical: US$87 to US$104
  TOTAL: US$2154 to US$2433
*All fees were converted from Philippine Pesos to U.S. Dollars.
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Labor brokers and employers practiced contract substitution, whereby the terms of employ-
ment were changed over the course of the recruitment and hiring process. Once on the job, 
workers found employment conditions to be different from what they were promised.
Employers routinely deducted “runaway insurance” – or forced savings – of 30 percent from 
workers’ salaries. This practice, in conjunction with the withholding of workers’ passports 
by brokers or employers, effectively ties workers to their jobs even when the conditions and 
terms of the job are unfavorable or contrary to what was promised to them. Freedom of 
movement is further curtailed by requirement to put up a deposit for temporary emergency 
trips home, and the requirement that workers must pay their own return airfare and pay any 
recruitment debt in full if they wish to terminate their contract early. 
Case Study: Benny
Deceived and in Debt
After graduating from a four-year computer school in the Philippines, Benny could not find 
any work so he turned to a labor broker to help him get a job in an IT factory in Taiwan. He 
was charged US$2,223 for his recruitment and traveling fees, for which he borrowed money 
from his mother. Upon arrival in Taiwan, he was told that his fees were converted to Taiwan-
ese dollars which increased his debt by 150 percent. He was also only paid half of what he 
was expecting due to cost of living expenses and a forced savings of 30 percent. Benny 
was required to work six to seven days a week, 12 hours a day and overtime was mandato-
ry. By the end of his contract he was forced to pay another US$444 to extend his contract. 
Soon after that, the factory announced that they could no longer afford to keep all of the 
employees but his extension fee would not be returned to him. He was also informed that 
his forced savings were slotted for his return ticket home. Benny returned to the Philippines 
with no money. His family’s home was flooded by a typhoon, and he is applying for more 
work in Taiwan. This time, he hopes to go with an “honest” broker. 
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By charging aspiring workers recruitment fees far above the legal ceilings and deceiving 
them about salaries and job types, labor brokers in Asia introduce key vulnerabilities to 
forced labor in the information technology industry. 
To a certain extent, in sending countries, labor brokers continue to enjoy the support of 
states whose economic policies encourage labor exportation. Laws regulating fees are in 
place, but these are routinely violated or circumvented. The actual fees charged to work-
ers in sending countries still commonly exceed legal limits. Laws requiring contracts to be 
signed pre-departure, and be approved by sending country overseas employment authori-
ties, are circumvented with the practice of making workers sign supplemental agreements. 
The terms in these supplemental agreements can be contradictory to the terms in the con-
tract signed in sending countries. 
Direct hiring programs have been developed between sending and receiving countries (i.e. 
Philippines and Taiwan), and implemented by a few employers, most still choose to employ 
the services of labor brokers. However, there is a distrust of government initiatives. Employ-
ers and workers interviewed expressed concern that that this program would be slow and 
inefficient, and subject to corruption. Employers continue to depend heavily on their labor 
brokers, with whom they have had long-standing relationships. In the Philippines, the direct 
hiring program, which can be a very viable option for workers, is limited in scope and may 
be unprepared for bulky transactions and large job orders. Currently, the service is available 
only for employers seeking to rehire currently employed migrant workers whose contracts 
are about to expire. 
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There is also a concern among worker advocates that the direct hiring program contravenes 
provisions in the Migrant Workers’ Act of the Philippines, particularly the joint and solidary 
liability of recruiter and employer, since the state (as represented by the Philippines Overseas 
Employment Administration) in this case cannot be sued. Furthermore, the origin country 
does not have any legal jurisdiction outside its territory and the destination county does not 
always assume full responsibility unless migrant workers are permanent residents or 
become citizens. 
A deeper and more robust commitment to direct hiring programs and bilateral initiatives 
is warranted in the region. At the same time it must be recognized that labor brokers will 
continue to play an essential role in the information technology industry. Therefore, Verité 
recommends a two-pronged effort at strengthening the enforcement of laws and regulations 
governing brokers, and educating jobseekers so that they are equipped to select “good” 
brokers and take all possible measures to protect themselves against fraud. More work 
should also be done to require destination factories to pay for the services of brokers; and 
likewise to empower and strengthen the bargaining power of brokers themselves.
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Labor Brokers and Hiring Traps in the United States
The third focus of Verité’s 2009 research was U.S. agriculture – a sector that has in recent 
decades seen a dramatic concentration of production, with “megagrowers” dominating 
today’s market. The sector is intensely competitive, and even megagrowers themselves 
are subject to a “cost-price” squeeze in which the cost of raw materials is escalating while 
the price of agricultural goods is shrinking.16
Legal status of hired crop farmworkers, 1989-2006
Thus while the supply chain for agricultural products is relatively short, the downward 
pressure on labor cost is immense. Growers in recent years have become almost exclu-
sively reliant on a migrant workforce comprised of a mix of undocumented workers and 
temporary contract workers on H2 “guestworker” visas. These workers, regardless of visa 
status, hail primarily from Latin America. 
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Migrant farm workers in the United States are often managed not by growers themselves, 
but by “farm labor contractors” – labor brokers that handle a mix of recruitment, hiring, 
transport and/or management of migrant workers on-site.
Labor brokers in U.S. agriculture come in many shapes and sizes and range from large 
organizations placing thousands of farm workers in agricultural jobs all over the globe to 
small specialized brokers or unregistered brokers working exclusively with undocumented 
workers in particular regions of the United States. Labor brokers usually work with recruiters 
in sending countries, although some brokers provide the full package: recruitment, contract 
arrangement and work-management services. Farm labor contractors are a ubiquitous pres-
ence on U.S. farms, managing the work of small or large teams of migrant farmworkers. 
In many cases, the farm labor contractor is, technically speaking, the worker’s employer; 
and the actual employer is not involved in payment issues or direct supervision and is thus 
unaware of labor violations. However several recent court cases have held the employer 
responsible for forced labor that was perpetrated by a farm labor contractor.17
Forced labor is a well-known phenomenon in agriculture in the United States; and labor 
brokers are key actors in the system, both for documented and undocumented workers. 
Verité’s research found that the primary mechanism for entrapping workers in situations of 
forced labor is the facilitation of grave indebtedness prior to arrival in the United States. The 
brokers themselves can be large or small; and workers on temporary guestworker visas 
seem more vulnerable to falling prey to forced labor schemes than undocumented work-
ers. When the broker is involved in recruitment and transportation, workers’ vulnerability to 
forced labor is greatly increased. When migrant workers are recruited from within the United 
States (instead of from abroad) and there is no debt involved, Verité found the level of coer-
cion and vulnerability to forced labor to be lower. 
 
“One comes from Chile with the hope 
of helping their family. I grew up with-
out shoes, with peeled feet because we 
didn’t have enough money. So I was very 
happy to have the opportunity to come 
to the United States. In Chile we think 
we will pick dollars from a tree. One 
doesn’t know that they will suffer more 
than in Chile because at least in Chile 
the bosses don’t treat us so bad.
   -Chilean cattleherder   
          on an H2A visa in the   
          western United States
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The legal route into the United States for temporary work is the H-2 program, and this pro-
gram creates some vulnerabilities of its own. The H-2 program is widely criticized by worker 
advocates for lacking adequate protections for work, health, and housing; legalizing the pay-
ment of subminimum wages; and – because workers are, for practical purposes, bound to 
work for one or more employers – entrapping workers at specified worksites for the duration 
of their stay in the United States. 
Forced labor is a well-known phenomenon in agriculture in the United States; and labor 
brokers are key actors in the system, both for documented and undocumented workers. 
Verité’s research found that the primary mechanism for entrapping workers in situations of 
forced labor is the facilitation of grave indebtedness prior to arrival in the United States. The 
brokers themselves can be large or small; and workers on temporary guestworker visas 
seem more vulnerable to falling prey to forced labor schemes than undocumented work-
ers. When the broker is involved in recruitment and transportation, workers’ vulnerability to 
forced labor is greatly increased. When migrant workers are recruited from within the United 
States (instead of from abroad) and there is no debt involved, Verité found the level of coer-
cion and vulnerability to forced labor to be lower.
The legal route into the United States for temporary work is the H-2 program, and this pro-
gram creates some vulnerabilities of its own. The H-2 program is widely criticized by worker 
advocates for lacking adequate protections for work, health, and housing; legalizing the pay-
ment of subminimum wages; and – because workers are, for practical purposes, bound to 
work for one or more employers – entrapping workers at specified worksites for the duration 
of their stay in the United States.
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Case Study: Fernando
Legal Guestworker Trafficked into Forced Labor
Undocumented workers are also vulnerable to forced labor in U.S. agriculture. These workers, 
the vast majority of whom are from Latin America, are typically smuggled or trafficked over the 
border with Mexico by coyotes, who are in some cases also their labor brokers or employers. 
Because of their undocumented status, these workers are by nature vulnerable to abusive la-
bor practices and forced labor. In some egregious cases, coyotes hold workers hostage either 
until their families pay additional money or until they provide a certain amount of labor. 
Fernando was a mechanic in Guatemala but wanted to earn more money to send his kids to 
school. He solicited the help of a labor broker to acquire an H-2B Visa to work in the United 
States. He took out a loan from his brother for the broker and travel fees, which totaled 
around US$2,000, and traveled to North Carolina, where he thought he would be working. 
Upon arrival he and 11 other migrants were piled into a van and brought to New England to 
do nursery work. Fernando was suddenly an illegal worker in the U.S. because H2B visas do 
not cover plant nursery work. Fernando was housed in an apartment with seven roommates 
an hour from the jobsite. His passport was taken from him and he was required to sign a 
contract in English that he could not read. 
At the nursery Fernando worked 12 to 15 hour days six days a week, for around US$1.20 
an hour after deductions for rent, electricity, gas, telephone, transportation and taxes. The 
broker taunted Fernando and the other workers, saying they were not sweating from hard 
work, but from nervousness. Later Fernando discovered that taxes were actually never paid 
and he had to come up with that money again. 
Eventually someone noticed the strange situation of these men and assisted the workers 
in leaving their jobs and pursuing a lawsuit accusing the nursery and the broker of human 
trafficking; forcing the workers to work nearly 80 hours per week; paying less than minimum 
wage; and denying medical care for injuries on the job. The parent company of the nursery 
eventually settled and the workers received a small sum of money as compensation, but not 
enough to pay off their recruitment debts.
“So they took us to that neighborhood 
and they specifically told us that we could 
not leave the apartment. They said, “Get 
out of the van, get into the apartment, 
and don’t leave. If you want to guy some-
thing do it here but not further.’”
   -Fernando from Guatema-
la, entered the United States on an H2B 
visa, trafficked and forced to work on a 
plant nursery in the northeast.
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Verité’s research indicates that the greatest opportunity for forced labor occurs when the 
labor broker is also the money lender and/or manages the workers in the United States. In 
many cases, undocumented workers in fact enjoy greater freedom of movement and bet-
ter pay than legal H-2 visa holders, since undocumented workers can, in most cases, walk 
away from an abusive employer. Employers demonstrated a low awareness of signs of 
forced labor among H-2 visa holders who worked for a labor broker on their farms.
Some farm labor contractors in the United States are unusually powerful, which leads to in-
consistent U.S. regulations that strongly favor employers and lead to labor abuses in forestry 
and cattle and sheepherding, for example.
Regarding enforcement, to date, sending country and U.S. governments have not shared 
available information regarding exploitative labor brokers abroad, which could greatly facili-
tate a more honest and equitable approach to migrant worker issues. The number of labor 
inspectors in the United States is inadequate, leading to a lack of oversight, particularly for 
the H-2A farm worker program. The separate agendas of U.S. immigration and labor of-
ficials have tended to penalize farm workers instead of exploitative farm labor contractors. 
This can be seen in the inability of labor officials to carry out laws regarding H-2 workers and 
the emphasis on penalizing illegal workers, which has resulted in an erosion of trust in U.S. law 
enforcement among the migrant worker community and a greater vulnerability for forced labor. 
Many worker advocates related to Verité the inability to prosecute brokers or employers un-
der charges of forced labor because the link between the recruitment debt and the employer 
could not be proven. Current understandings of the “menace of penalty” and other elements 
of the definition of forced labor must be more nuanced in order to capture the real situa-
tions of servitude that occur with regularity on U.S. farms. Isolation as a parameter for forced 
labor, for example, requires a broader legal interpretation than is currently used. Workers 
can be isolated not only physically, but also by language, through threats, and also through 
psychological games played by labor brokers to keep workers in line. The threat of deporta-
tion cannot be overestimated as a coercive tool for guestworkers, since most have incurred 
extensive debt to moneylenders in their home countries with no way to repay it unless they 
remain working in the United States.
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SECTION II
WHAT TO LOOK FOR: 
RED FLAGS FOR  VULNERABILITY TO 
BROKER-INDUCED HIRING TRAPS 
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Red Flags For Vulnerability To 
Broker-Induced Hiring Traps 
Setting the stage: indicators of vulnerability
 • Migrant population at the worksite
 • Recruitment and management performed by labor brokers
 • Length of chain from recruitment to employment
 • Low recruiting fees for the employer ensures broker seeks funds from worker
 • Use of temporary contract “guestworker” programs
The bait: recruitment and hiring
 • High entrance fee, encouraging debt
 • Contract substitutions/late changes
 • Fraudulent visa practices
 • Deception in job, salary, length of contract, benefits
The switch: revealed in the workplace
 • Labor broker as on-site manager
 • Passport confiscation
 • Deductions, withholdings and illegally low pay
 • Employer control of workers’ bank accounts
 • Break-contract penalties
 • Isolation
 • Threats and violence
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Verité’s in-depth research on the connection between labor brokers and the trafficking of mi-
grant workers in Southeast Asia, India and the Middle East, and the United States demon-
strates the remarkably diverse sets of circumstances and settings under which the actions 
of labor brokers pave the way for migrant workers to become entrapped in jobs overseas. 
No two cases in Verité’s reporting are completely alike, nor are the specific ingredients that 
constitute entrapment. In fact, forced labor is not always easy to spot, and workers may 
not acknowledge being in situations of forced labor due to shame and fear of reprisal. But 
amidst this patchwork variety of exploitation, some common threads can be found – most 
importantly the debt and deception that almost always set the stage for slavery. Any effort to 
stem human trafficking and forced labor among migrant worker populations must address 
these root causes of the exploitation that unfolds at the workplace. 
To prevent hiring traps, employers must be aware of the risks of forced labor before they 
contract with labor brokers. They should put in place mechanisms to ensure that brokers 
employ fair hiring techniques and that migrant workers brought in by labor brokers are pro-
tected from exploitation both before they set foot on the worksite and after they have
begun working.
Employers should also be aware of common management practices that can exacerbate 
the vulnerabilities of migrant workers to exploitation, and seek to avoid them. 
Integral to these efforts is an understanding of some of the key indicators of the risk of hu-
man trafficking in recruitment and hiring, and of forced labor at the workplace. Verité’s re-
search – a qualitative effort to understand in-depth the triggers for hiring traps and enslave-
ment – provides a solid basis from which to begin. Our research yielded a cluster of factors 
which, independently or in various combinations, were contributors to situations of human 
trafficking and forced labor for migrant workers. Verité refers to these as “red flags” for vul-
nerability to broker-induced hiring traps. Identifying the presence of these “red flags” is an 
entry point for the detection and remediation of hiring traps and the promotion of fair hiring 
in the global economy. 
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Setting the Stage: How Brokers Relate to Employers
The following issues should be considered as starting points for analysis. If one or more of 
these preconditions for risk of trafficking and forced labor among migrant workers is present, 
further research should be performed. 
1- Presence of Migrant Workers: A Captive Workforce 
At the outset, it must be reiterated that any workplace in which migrant workers – and par-
ticularly those on temporary work visas – constitute a significant segment of the workforce 
should be considered at high risk for forced labor. But even workplaces with only a handful 
of migrant workers are not exempt from risk. 
The simple fact is that workers are at heightened vulnerability to modern-day slavery when 
they have been brought to work away from their homes, and that this vulnerability is gener-
ated or exacerbated by the involvement of labor brokers. These facts must be acknowl-
edged by brokers and employers alike who seek to employ migrant workers. 
Thus wherever migrant workers are employed, a set of targeted checks must be in place to 
ensure that these workers are not subject to forced labor.
The guest workers ... aren’t allowed to 
go anywhere. They have a contract with 
us and we have one with them. If they 
leave, it’s our responsibility to inform ICE 
[Immigration and Customs Enforcement]. 
That’s why the guest worker program 
works. 
  
 -co-owner of an apple farm in
 Yakima Valley, Washington 1
RED FLAGS:
ENTRY POINTS FOR 
DETECTION AND 
REMEDIATION
40
2- Extensive Use of Labor Brokers to Hire Migrant Workers
When migrant workers are hired through brokers, the conditions of their recruitment and hiring 
are no longer under the control of, or even readily apparent to, employers. The debt and decep-
tion that can accompany the hiring process are unknown to employers as a vulnerability factor.
Verité’s research on forced labor in U.S. agriculture led us to speak with Andy Grant, a Colorado 
organic farmer who was sued by a group of undocumented workers from Mexico who were 
enslaved by their farm labor contractor. Grant claimed that he was “shocked” to learn that im-
migrants employed on his farm were being underpaid by their contractor and that he had been 
named in a civil suit. Grant learned, like many companies, that outsourcing work to labor brokers 
does not exempt employers from liability. Instead, it increases workers’ vulnerability to exploita-
tion and forced labor and increases employers’ risk to reputational damage and to lawsuits. In 
fact, when asked whether he could provide any advice to other employers on identifying risk 
signs that workers were being subjected to forced labor by brokers, Andy Grant said that the 
only way to ensure that workers were not exploited was to “not hire through brokers.” 
While this represents an extreme view, it nonetheless encapsulates the fact that risk is inherent in 
this system, particularly where migrant workers are concerned. 
3- Many Different Actors in the Recruitment and Hiring 
Supply Chain
A useful gauge of the vulnerability to forced labor or other exploitation among migrant workforces 
is the length of the recruitment-and-hiring “supply chain” experienced by the worker. This should 
be measured not only in terms of actors and steps involved in a worker getting from home base 
to point of employment, but also in terms of the distance the worker travels, and other “degrees 
of separation” between the worker and his/her employer – including the inability to communi-
cate directly because different languages are spoken, or because of different cultural and social 
understandings and practices. 
It is fair to say that the longer the chain, and the more actors involved, the more opaque the 
conditions of recruitment and hiring become, and the higher the likelihood that abuse may occur. 
Verité refers to this concept as the measure of compound vulnerability in recruitment and hiring. 
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4- Cost Analysis of Worker Payment vs. Broker Fees 
A simple and effective way to assess the possibility that migrant workers are being exploited 
or even enslaved is to “do the math” – in other words, to ask (1) how much did workers pay 
to obtain their jobs; and (2) how much does the broker receive from the employer to man-
age workers on-site. In the words of the International Labor Organization, in many cases it 
quickly becomes obvious that an employer is demanding costs of a broker “so low as to 
make the use of coercive methods more likely.” 18 
5- Terms of Work Visa 
Another “first cut” at potential vulnerabilities to human trafficking and forced labor faced by 
migrant workers is to examine the terms of the work visas under which they labor. 
Verité’s research in the United States and the Middle East found that visa terms that make a 
migrant worker’s legal status contingent on continued employment (or sponsorship) by one 
employer can create a “tie that binds” when combined with debt and deception in recruit-
ment and hiring. It can also create a situation in which the threat of deportation – and con-
sequent inability to pay back debt – is a “menace of penalty” tantamount to forced labor. 
Research from the United States was surprising, too, in its finding that undocumented 
(illegal) workers actually enjoyed greater freedom of movement and better pay than legal 
guestworker visa holders. Finally, legal provisions that exempt migrant workers from mini-
mum wage provisions can also contribute to the inability of migrant workers to earn enough 
to pay back recruitment debt. 
Verité will discuss mechanisms to mitigate the effects of these work-visa provisions in an 
upcoming Policy Brief.
“The incredible thing is that there are 
Mexican immigrants who are working at the 
ranches without documents, who are doing 
the same thing and are receiving the mini-
mum wage for fewer working hours. And 
the guestworkers are working more, are 
being treated like slaves, and are receiving 
a small percentage of the minimum wage, 
and all of this is sanctioned by the law.”
-A lawyer who has 
represented foreign migrant 
cattleherders on H2A visas
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The Bait: Preconditions for Human Trafficking and 
Forced Labor in Recruitment and Hiring 
Verité found two factors in recruitment and hiring to be almost universal factors in hiring 
traps: debt and various types of deception, including contract substitution. Fraudulent visa prac-
tices were also found to be a strong indicator of vulnerability to trafficking and forced labor. 
6- Amount and Location of Worker Debt
Debt is perhaps the most powerful and determinant factor in setting the stage for a migrant 
worker to become enslaved. 
In traditional notions of debt bondage, the debt is held by the employer, thereby establishing 
a direct relationship of subservience and obligation. A modern-day understanding of debt 
bondage must be more nuanced, and should include scenarios under which debt is held by 
an independent party that does not work in collusion with the employer. Rather, the exis-
tence of the debt – and the urgent need of the migrant worker to repay it, particularly if the 
money is owed to those with connections to criminal elements, for example – means that 
this worker will be more easily manipulated by the employer to accept illegally low wages, 
poor working conditions, excessive work hours and the like. This worker will also be much 
more affected by threats of deportation – and consequent cessation of her earning poten-
tial– than a worker with no debt obligations. 
Masin-og, the manager of MW [a Philip-
pines-based brokerage agency], repeat-
edly told workers, “If you want to rise 
from poverty and realize your dreams, 
trust us.” She used this phrase particu-
larly when encouraging workers to pay 
MW’s high application fees.
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Verité’s current research found that brokers charged migrant workers recruitment fees that 
ranged from a few hundred dollars to as high as US$25,000. Where laws placed ceilings on 
the level of recruitment fees, actual fees often exceeded this limit.19 It is worth noting here 
that the charging of any fee to workers by a broker is in contravention of internationally ac-
cepted standards, including the principles of the International Labor Organization and the 
International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (CIETT). 20
In the Philippines, the recruitment fee charged by many agencies deploying for Taiwan is 
around US$3,000, with a handful charging almost US$4,000. All workers interviewed by 
Verité reported being instructed by the broker to submit immigration paperwork reporting 
recruitment fees 75 to 80 percent lower than they actually paid. Workers financed their fees 
through loans from family members, banks or moneylenders; sometimes at usurious
interest rates. 
In the United States, labor experts and workers interviewed by Verité reported brokerage 
fees ranging from US$3,000 to US$25,000 among workers coming in legally on H2A and 
H2B guestworker visas. Workers borrowed from family members and in other cases from 
moneylenders. Interest rates were sometimes usurious, reaching up to 20 percent monthly. 
Brokers or moneylenders affiliated with brokers sometimes held workers’ titles to land or 
other valuables as collateral. Once in the United States, some workers were threatened with 
deportation, blacklisting, confiscation of land, or violence against themselves and their fami-
lies if they complained. 
In India, migrants to the GCC states of the Middle East reported paying recruitment fees that 
ranged from US$1200 to US$3800 – amounts far above the legal limit.21 Workers inter-
viewed by Verité used various means to finance their recruitment fees, including borrowing 
from relatives, banks, or moneylenders; selling assets such as jewelry; and taking out mort-
gages on family homes. 
“They tell you that you will have a horse, 
lots of benefits, good treatment, a good 
salary, but when you arrive you find a 
huge surprise….”
      
– Ricardo, a Chilean cattleherder held 
captive by his employer in the western 
United States
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7- Deception and Contract Substitution
Debt is almost always accompanied by some sort of deception in recruitment and hiring. 
Countless workers described to Verité being promised one thing by the broker and experi-
encing something entirely different in the host country. Deception was typically focused on 
the level of salary and availability of work. Workers were also lied to about the nature of the 
work they would perform and the location in which they would perform it. Sometimes this 
deception is formalized in the practice of “contract substitution” or the addition of “supple-
mental agreements” to existing contracts. 
It is common practice for Philippine workers bound for employment in IT manufacturing 
facilities in Taiwan to be required to sign a standard contract provided by the Philippine 
government prior to departure, and then another contract containing less favorable terms 
when they arrive in Taiwan. In many cases, terms and conditions pertaining to work hours 
and wage rates vary significantly. In some instances, workers were summarily transferred 
to jobsites other than the ones indicated in the contract. It is also common for employers 
and/or brokers to require workers sign “supplemental agreements” – sets of agreements, 
provisions, and terms appended to the original contract – before they begin work. These 
supplemental terms typically entail added costs or restrictions for workers. In one factory, for 
instance, the workers reported to Verité that they signed supplementary agreements indicat-
ing, among other things, a factory savings deduction of US$155 from their salary, and that 
they should compensate the employer US$622 for breaking their contract. 
RED FLAGS:
ENTRY POINTS FOR 
DETECTION AND 
REMEDIATION
45
Supplemental Agreements – A Closer Look 
Employment Commitment 
I agree that the employer for safekeeping shall keep my passport and chop (visa) until termi-
nation of the employment contract upon departure.
Supplementary Employment Agreement 
It is my sole willingness to accept the terms and conditions, compensation and benefits 
package of my employment with the company. Shall I have anything in opposition to these, 
I shall accept immediate termination of employment contract with the company and waive 
whatever claims I may have.
Fee Deduction Agreement
I understand and agree to pay monthly and other fees required in employment related 
documents during employment in Taiwan. The factory will deduct the fees indicated from 
my monthly salary, and in the event that my monthly salary is not sufficient, the factory will 
deduct the unpaid balance from my savings fund.
Monthly Savings Agreement 
I acknowledge that the factory can deduct TWD 3000 (US$93) from my payroll account and 
transfer it to a savings account until the contract expires. I cannot withdraw or close the \
savings account without the company’s approval.
Penalty for Breach of Contract
I will be subjected to a breach of contract penalty of TWD 2,000 (US$62) multiplied by the 
number of months the I have been employed in the facility (for a maximum of 12 months) as 
compensation for the company’s loss under the following terms :
 • 100% - violation of company/dorm rules and regulations
 • Self termination
 • Poor work performance
 • Other reasons that cause great loss to the company
Penalty computation based on decision of the company:
 • 50% - Penalty computation based on decision of the company
 • 30% - Penalty computation based on decision of the company
Following are examples from Verité’s research of real supplemental conditions appended to 
the contracts of Philippine workers in IT manufacturing facilities in Taiwan. 
“They tell you that you have a horse, 
lots of benefits, good treatment, a good 
salary, but when you arrive you find a 
huge surprise...” 
  -Ricardo, a Chilean cattleherder 
held captive by him employer in the 
western US. 
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In United States agriculture, deception in recruitment and hiring manifests in several ways. 
One chronic problem for migrant workers on temporary visas is that they are not given the 
full number of weeks of work specified in their contracts. Thus they earn much less than 
they were promised by the broker. 22 Often the contract differs from what the worker was 
led to believe in the sending country. For example, a Thai worker testified: “They showed me 
all the documents, and they are a legal company approved by the Thai government, and the 
information about the jobs they showed me seems real.… But it turns out the H-2 guest-
worker program is seasonal: The job must last less than one year — not the three years that 
the broker promised me.” 23 Chilean cattle and sheepherders interviewed by Verité reported 
that they were forced by their broker to sign a contract at the airport – while they were being 
paged to report to the gate – which specified lower pay and longer hours than those 
originally promised to them. 24
In India, information regarding salary conditions for migrant workers bound for the Middle 
East was sometimes misleading or incomplete. For example, a driver interviewed by Verité 
was told that he would receive a commission over and above his pay, for daily vehicle us-
age. However, he later learned that he was responsible for fuel costs out of his own salary, 
and the cost of fuel wound up being more than his commission. In general, while work-
ers typically possess a minimum level of education, they find it difficult to understand the 
contents of the English-language contract and are not offered an explanation either by the 
recruiting agent or the employer. When the contract signing takes place in India, it is usu-
ally either at the airport or directly before departure, and the worker is given little time to go 
through the details of the contract before signing. Nor do workers typically receive a copy of 
the contract once it is signed. When the worker signs the contract in the receiving country, 
it is usually at the time of receipt of the work permit, and companies sometimes threaten to 
deport workers if they refuse to sign.25 Workers also reported being asked to sign or finger-
print a blank sheet of paper.26 While how these blank pages are used is not clear, it does 
appear that sometimes the employer is able to use them to avoid paying the “end of em-
ployment gratuity” – a one-time payment received at the fulfillment of the 
employment contract.27 
47
8- Fraudulent Visa Practices
Another form of betrayal by a labor broker is the issuance of a false visa. Verité’s research 
found substantial evidence of this practice among Indian workers bound for the Middle East. 
In most cases, workers cleared Indian immigration with no difficulty and only discovered 
the false visa upon arrival in the Middle East, where imprisonment was one consequence. 
Twenty percent of workers interviewed by Verité in the state of Kerala had spent time in jail 
while job-seeking or working in the Middle East, due to problems related to visas and work 
permits. Length of incarceration ranged from one to eight months. Other outcomes found by 
Verité research included “smuggling” of these adrift jobseekers into underground forced la-
bor rings once abroad, or the decision of the jobseeker to forge out on his/her own to obtain 
illegal (and therefore dangerous) employment. 
Guatemalan and Mexican jobseekers aspiring to work in the United States also recounted 
instances of visa fraud, where brokers took their recruitment fees and then disappeared, 
leaving these jobseekers saddled with immense debt and little means to pay it off. 
Twenty percent of workers interviewed by Verité in the state of Kerala had spent time in 
jail while job-seeking or working in the Middle East, due to problems related to visas and 
work permits.
Once on-the-job, migrant workers who are highly leveraged due to excessive recruitment 
fees, and/or who were subject to deception in recruitment and hiring, are exceedingly vul-
nerable to exploitation. In Verité’s experience, employers engage in a range of practices that 
exacerbate vulnerability to forced labor. 
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The Switch: How Forced Labor Unfolds at 
the Workplace
9- Labor Broker as On-Site Manager 
Where labor brokers manage the work of migrants as their on-site supervisor, the risk of abu-
sive practices is high. Where the broker was also the moneylender, or has connections to the 
moneylender that financed the recruitment fee, the conditions for forced labor are ripe. 
Verité’s research in the United States included a look at the case of Moises and Maria Ro-
driguez, farm labor contractors eventually convicted of transporting illegal aliens and har-
boring and employing smuggled aliens. In this case, undocumented Mexican workers were 
held in slave-like conditions on an organic fruit and vegetable farm in northern Colorado by 
Rodriguez – a small labor broker who financed the smuggling of the workers into the United 
States. Rodriguez had ties to the coyote that brought the workers into the United States, 
and he arranged their transport. Rodriguez inflated the actual cost of the workers’ journey 
and used this “debt” as the primary mechanism for enslaving the workers. Rodriguez en-
sured that workers paid back their smuggling fees through implicit and explicit threats and 
in some cases the use of violence. This created a situation in which they were indebted to 
Moises and were unable to leave his employment until they paid off the fees. 
The grower – an organic farmer self-described as an “outspoken adherent to social justice” 
who had worked in the past to help legalize undocumented immigrants and paid his work-
ers above the minimum wage – was “shocked” to learn that immigrants employed on his 
farm were being underpaid by their contractor. In stark contrast, undocumented workers 
who were directly employed by the grower labored freely, under relatively good conditions.
 In Malaysia, Verité found that migrant workers managed directly by IT manufacturing fa-
cilities were at much less risk of being overcharged for recruitment than migrant workers 
whose labor was “subcontracted” out to be managed by labor brokers on-site. 
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10- Passport Confiscation
One of the most chronic abuses reported by migrant workers across the globe is the con-
fiscation of identity documents — in particular, passports and work visas. Employers often 
rationalize this practice by claiming that they are taking the documents for “safekeeping” 
and that workers may have access to them at any time. In practice, it is not always so easy 
or comfortable to request access to one’s passport from the employer; and Verité has often 
found situations in which access is restricted in large or small ways – by having to request in 
advance or lodge a deposit to “take out” your passport, for example.
Without a passport, a migrant worker cannot freely and safely move about in the host coun-
try, and is in fact often at great risk of imprisonment if picked up by police without papers. 
Indian workers migrating to the GCC States of the Middle East must provide their passports 
to employers in order to receive a work permit. They typically never get them back. One 
hundred percent of workers from Kerala interviewed by Verité had their passports confis-
cated upon arrival in the Middle East. 
In Malaysian IT manufacturing facilities, migrant workers reported being required to turn 
over their passports to their employers. In order for workers to be allowed to “borrow” their 
passports, they often were required to sign a logbook indicating their reasons for doing so. 
In some companies, workers were only able to access their passports at the end of the 
contract. At one company, if workers needed to borrow their passports for reasons such as 
opening a back account, they had to be accompanied to the bank by a representative of the 
company. Another labor agency required workers to give monetary deposits when they bor-
row their passports. Workers were also required to put up deposits if they needed to return 
home for temporary emergencies. In Taiwan, labor brokers or employers similarly withheld or 
restricted access to workers’ passports and required workers to obtain broker’s or manage-
ment’s permission before accessing their passports.
In the United States, confiscation of passports was found to be an issue in all cases re-
searched by Verité, where legal guestworkers were concerned. A lawsuit against Imperial 
Nurseries in the northeastern United States, for instance, charged that agents of Imperial 
confiscated Guatemalan H-2B workers’ passports to prevent their escape, forced them 
to work nearly 80 hours a week for far less than minimum wage, denied them emergency 
medical care and threatened them with jail and deportation if they complained. 
The biggest problem is that they took 
away our documents and money. 
Where could I go without money and 
papers? No one could escape because 
he [the employer] kept all our money 
and documents.
      
– Ricardo, a Chilean cattleherder held 
captive by his  employer in the western 
United States
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Chilean cattle and sheepherders in the western United States were required to hand over 
their passports, as were Thai workers brought in by the large brokerage agency Global 
Horizons to labor on fruit and vegetable farms across the United States. The Southern 
Poverty Law Center reported numerous incidents in which employers destroyed passports 
or visas in order to convert workers into undocumented status. When this happens, there is 
little likelihood of a worker obtaining assistance from local law enforcement officials. In many 
jurisdictions, lawyers representing workers advise them to avoid calling police because they 
are more likely to take action against complaining workers than against the employer. 28 
11- Deductions, Fines, Withholdings and Illegally 
Low Pay
Many migrant workers are shocked when they receive their first paycheck. In Verité’s experi-
ence, take-home pay rarely adds up to what migrant workers anticipated, or what had been 
promised by the labor broker. 
There are many different mechanisms at play that reduce what migrant workers earn – and 
how much of their money they have control over – while in the host country. One mecha-
nism of asserting control over the migrant worker is to withhold part of his/her earnings as 
a kind of “forced savings”, to be paid out to the worker at the end of the contract. Other 
mechanisms are to charge – sometimes excessively – for costs that the worker did not 
anticipate (in many cases because the broker did not make the charges known to the work-
er at the time of hire). Deductions are commonly levied for housing, food, tools, uniforms, 
and travel. Some of the more far-fetched charges that Verité encountered were for cleaning 
the boss’s car, or for use of the bathroom. The structure of workers’ pay is also sometimes 
such that workers are penalized – in some cases quite heavily – for not meeting quotas. 
In Taiwan, employers are permitted by law to deduct up to 30 percent of a migrant worker’s 
salary and place it in a bank account in the worker’s name. The worker typically has no 
access to the account. This is a system that everybody knows and refers to as “runaway 
insurance.” In essence, it is used as a means to guarantee against the worker’s premature 
termination of his or her contract or transfer to another factory. In most cases, these savings 
are returned to the workers at the end of the contract; and in some factories, workers are 
provided means to check the balance on their accounts. In many factories, however, 
employers also cover the workers’ return airfare with part of their savings.
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Migrant workers are typically forced into such savings arrangement upon arrival in Taiwan 
and they are often sent home if they object. The money is not returned if the worker ends 
work early due to abuse or exploitation, thereby deterring workers from seeking assistance.
Taiwan-based IT manufacturing facilities also commonly levy deductions from Philippine 
workers’ paychecks for room and board, broker service fees, taxes, health insurance, and 
labor insurance. (Under Philippine law, the foreign employer should provide free food or 
compensatory allowance and free suitable housing.) In some cases, workers are levied 
unclear charges for housing, entertainment, food, medical costs, insurance payments that 
are lumped together with deductions for brokers’ services. These deductions are not always 
detailed in the original contracts; rather they are usually indicated in supplementary agree-
ments that workers sign upon arrival in the factory. 
In Taiwan, employers are allowed by law to delay payments to workers in times of economic 
distress, contributing greatly to the workers’ multiple layers of indebtedness. In Verité’s ex-
perience, when workers are not paid on time or when their salaries are delayed, they com-
monly look to obtain loans from local moneylenders to pay just the interest portion of their 
loans back home. Local moneylenders charge ten percent monthly interest on these loans, 
and also require that the workers surrender their ATM cards (on which they draw their sala-
ries), which workers do not get back until they are able to repay the loan in full.
Indian migrants who had worked in the GCC states of the Middle East reported that their 
contract terms and actual conditions differed substantially, particularly with regard to food, 
lodging, and salary. Forty percent of workers reported salary withholdings by employers. 
Those working for individual employers as drivers and household staff were particularly 
vulnerable; and it was not uncommon, according to interviewees, to have no payment for six 
to eight months after the job began. Individual and company employers also routinely de-
ducted for visa and work permit renewals, although this was supposed to be covered by the 
employer. Often, employers deducted for food when free food was included as a benefit. 
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Deductions and withholdings can some-
times reach the point of the absurd: One 
forestry worker in the southern United 
States technically was paid $7 per hour 
for 15 hours of work, but earned only 13 
cents an hour after deductions. His pay-
check for this period was $1.98. Since 
it cost $2 to cash the check, the worker 
decided to keep it instead. It later served 
as evidence of payment violations. 29
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Twenty-eight-year-old Imran wanted to work as a driver in the GCC States because his 
father had worked as a mason in Dubai. Imran’s family had built a large house, for which the 
family was still in debt. Also, Imran was ready to start thinking about marriage.
In his hometown of Kannur, making a good marriage match is difficult if the groom has not 
worked in the GCC States. In fact, all of Imran’s friends were already working there. Imran 
paid US$1,512 in recruitment fees to a recruiting agency and got a job as a driver for an 
individual in Saudi Arabia that would pay US$259 per month with an incentive to earn more. 
Imran signed a contract before departure, which included the salary, an incentive to earn 
more and free food and lodging. Upon arrival, Imran was required to work long hours and 
had to pay for fuel from his own pocket. He was paid half the salary written in his contract, 
and after subtracting fuel costs, he made nothing. He appealed to his recruiting agency, who 
denied responsibility for an employer’s breach of contract. Imran decided to return to India, 
and since he had broken his work contract, he had to pay for his own return ticket. Imran 
currently works as a driver in Kannur, but the work is irregular and he hopes to return to the 
GCC States to earn money like his neighbors and friends. He is still in debt from his failed 
trip to Saudi Arabia. 
Case Study: Imran
Pay Whittled Away to Nothing in Saudi Arabia 
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Once in the United States to work either legally or illegally, many workers see their wages 
whittled away – sometimes to less than the minimum wage – by deductions for gas, food, 
lodging, tools and even, in one case, using a portable outhouse.30 According to a study 
released in November 2009, over two thirds of immigrants are subjected to minimum wage 
violations, and 80 percent are subjected to overtime payment violations.31 Many farm labor 
contractors find a number of ways to short workers on their wages. For example, shaving 
two hours off a ten-hour workday in the books will effectively lower the hourly wage rate 
from US$6.98 to US$5.58. In other cases, growers request workers for longer contract pe-
riods than necessary. When the work runs out, the guestworkers are forced to return home 
early – which, in practical terms, means that growers are not obligated to pay transportation 
costs and other guaranteed benefits. One North Carolina internal document estimates that 
85 percent of all H-2A work dries up five months into the seven-month season.32 Misclas-
sification is another problem. 
This occurs most often when workers who should be characterized as H-2A workers (be-
cause, for example, they are picking produce in the field) are instead brought to the United 
States as H-2B workers (and labeled as packing-shed workers, for example). This results in 
workers being paid substantially less than the wage rate they should lawfully be paid, since 
wage regulations for H-2A workers are more favorable than for H-2B workers. Another com-
mon form of misclassification involves misstating the kind of work H-2B employees will be 
performing, so that the prevailing wage rate is set for one kind of work, such as landscaping, 
when the workers actually will be doing work that warrants a higher prevailing wage rate, 
such as highway maintenance. There is virtually no recourse for workers to file grievances 
for these abuses.33 
In United States agriculture, there are many cases where the contract terms are changed 
from weekly wages to piecework, particularly in forestry. Instead of being paid the prevailing 
wage of US$6 to US$10 per hour as promised prior to departure, migrant forestry workers 
are often paid according to the number of seedlings planted – and are expected to empty 
two bags of 1,000 seedlings each per day. 
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Many are paid less than US$25 a day, despite working eight to 12 hours.34 One former 
H-2B worker who led a class action civil suit against Express Forestry said workers were 
promised a wage of US$8 an hour, but instead were paid on a piecework basis. Even 
though they worked from 6 a.m. to 7 p.m., six days a week, their paychecks said they had 
worked only 26 or 27 hours.35 Another forestry worker was promised travel reimburse-
ment and wages high enough to support his three young children in Guatemala. Instead, his 
piecework wages amounted to US$3.75 an hour, even before steep illegal deductions for 
telephone service and other costs.36 
12- Employer Control of Migrant Workers’ 
Bank Accounts
 
In the United States and Taiwan, Verité found instances of employers or brokers with access 
to, or complete control of, workers’ bank accounts. This creates an unquestionable situation 
of temporal “free labor” – in other words, slavery. As long as workers are not permitted ac-
cess to their earnings, they are essentially working for free. It also creates powerful leverage 
for the employer or broker over the worker. What worker would risk speaking out against an 
employer or broker, when that employer or broker had control over the worker’s bank 
account? Instead, migrant workers “toe the line” and labor in whatever conditions the em-
ployer demands, hoping that the promise of eventual access to earnings will be honored. 
In one factory in Taiwan, Verité researchers found that unauthorized deductions were made 
on migrant workers’ bank accounts by labor brokers. Many of the workers felt helpless and 
were afraid to make a complete report to Verité researchers for fear of reprisal from manage-
ment and brokers, and for fear of losing their job and not being able to settle their debts. 
Those who were already about to finish their contracts were more expressive of their anger 
and said that they were ready to lose their jobs in protest, since they had already settled 
their debts and had a few more months to the end of their contract.
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A cattle herder in the western United States had no access to the money he was making: 
He was never paid in check or cash. Instead his salary was deposited directly by his em-
ployer into a bank account. His boss kept all the bank papers and the ATM card, and the 
worker was not told the name or the location of the bank. 
 
13- Break-Contract Penalties
Heavy break-contract penalties are one of the more formal and transparent mechanisms to 
force a worker to stay on the job. 
In IT manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, it is a common practice for management to impose 
financial penalties for voluntary or involuntary termination of the contract. This occurs in the 
form of a “break-contract fee,” which is often levied only after workers arrive in Taiwan. In 
addition to this fee penalty, workers are also required to forfeit their return airfare payment, 
forced savings and tax refunds if they resign before the end of their contract. In one factory 
audited by Verité, for instance, management imposed a fee penalty of US$622 for workers 
that opted for early termination of their contract. In some cases, workers whose contracts 
were involuntarily terminated because of economic reasons were still forced to pay for their 
return airfare using the savings deducted from their monthly salary, and were unable to 
collect their tax refunds. Workers at another factory reported to Verité that they wanted to 
break their contract and leave after the first half of the contract period because pay was too 
low and work hours too long, but they could not afford to because they would have to pay 
about US$957 for “break contract” charges and return airfare.
14- Isolation
Isolation – geographic, social or cultural – can serve as a mechanism for trapping migrant 
workers at the worksite.37 Isolation can be obvious – such as when workers are located 
many miles from the closest town, and/or where workers have no way of transporting them-
selves away from a worksite. It can also take more subtle forms, for example in cases where 
workers do not speak the local language and therefore have no way of reaching out for help 
when abuse and exploitation occur.
By isolating workers and becoming their sole source of food, information, and communica-
tion with the outside world, labor brokers can often damage the victim’s sense of self-hood 
and autonomy and render him or her incapable of independent action or even thought.38
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In the GCC states of the Middle East, construction sites for hotels, public works, shop-
ping centers, and service stations are oftentimes sixty to seventy kilometers from the Indian 
worker’s company-supplied lodging. Workers usually stay in large groups in extremely con-
fined quarters. Outside the workplace, language can be a barrier, particularly if the worker is 
picked up by the police or labor department for visa irregularities. Workers reported to Verité 
that they were not provided with translators in these instances, and many spent months in 
prison without the ability to contact family. 
Another isolating factor is that grievance mechanisms are not readily available: In the UAE, a 
formal complaint must be submitted in writing, in Arabic, on an official form. In cases where 
the complaint relates to breach of contract, the worker may submit it to the complaints of-
fice of the Ministry of Labor in the Emirate that originally issued his work permit. There is one 
complaint office in Abu Dhabi and one in Dubai.39 Friday, a holiday in all Islamic countries, is 
the one day a week that most workers have off. However, since the Complaints Department 
of the Ministry of Labor and the Shari`a Court are closed on Fridays, this also means that 
workers have virtually no access to grievance mechanisms should they wish to protest their 
working conditions. 
In United States agriculture, housing for both H-2A and H-2B workers is often located in 
extremely isolated rural locations. In most instances, workers lack both vehicles and access 
to public transportation, making them totally dependent upon their employers for transporta-
tion to work, grocery stores, and banks. 
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Some employers charge exorbitant fees for rides to the grocery store. Much of the housing 
provided to workers lacks telephone service, isolating workers even further.40 While geo-
graphic isolation can be severe for workers in agricultural work camps, the perhaps more 
dire plight of H-2B forestry workers and sheepherders has remained out of the public eye, 
due to remote job sites and the wariness of the workers, who generally do not speak English 
and fear retaliation by employers.41
In 2008, a federal judge ruled that 3,000 pineros, the “men of the pines” who plant the 
massive pine plantations in the southern United States, had been grossly underpaid and 
subjected to abuse made possible by the workers’ social and physical isolation.42 Cattle 
herders interviewed by Verité worked in isolation for months at time on a ranch that spanned 
three states. One worker reported that it took him the whole night riding on horseback to 
get to the nearest ranch, where there was a telephone. He was unable to call a friend in the 
United States for six months because he did not know to dial “1” before the area code and 
there was nobody that he could ask. 
15- Threats and Violence 
Perhaps the most blatant mechanism for binding workers to the workplace is the use of 
threats and violence by employers or brokers. Like with isolation, threats and violence are 
not always necessary means to entrap migrant workers – debt and deception can be effec-
tive on their own. But when used, threats and violence are effective ways of “beating down” 
workers, rendering them a compliant and flexible workforce. 
In the GCC States of the Middle East, employers threatened Indian workers with dismissal. 
Several migrant workers interviewed by Verité who demanded fair treatment from employers 
were fired and sent back to India. Eighty percent of the workers interviewed reported verbal 
abuse from supervisors and bosses, particularly with individual employers. Physical abuse 
and harassment were also reported by interviewees for Verité’s research. 
“Although I do not know whether he [the 
broker] has any contacts in Guatemala, 
I imagine that he does, and it is so easy 
to get human beings to harm others. 
That is the problem. I wasn’t going to let 
him harm my family.”
    -Fernando, 
a Guatemalan on an H2B visa, forced 
to work on a plant nursery in the north-
eastern United States
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In United States agriculture, Verité found that employers and brokers use threats to assert 
control over the workers, such as threatening to call Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
Even when employers do not overtly threaten deportation, workers live in constant fear that 
if they complain, they will be sent home or not be rehired. According to the Southern Pov-
erty Law Center, Human Rights Watch has found that in the H-2A program there is “wide-
spread fear and evidence of blacklisting against workers who speak up about conditions, 
who seek assistance from Legal Services attorneys, or who become active in [the union].” 
Human Rights Watch also found evidence of a “campaign of intimidation” against workers to 
discourage any exercise of freedom of association by the workers.43
Threats of deportation and personal harm are common if workers complain of payment 
violations. When one Latino worker attempted to collect wages from a contractor, “The 
contractor raised his shirt and showed he had a gun — and that was enough,” said Eva San 
Martin, an advocate working in New Orleans. “He didn’t have to say any more. The worker 
left.”44 Labor brokers also threaten to harm workers’ families in their home countries. For 
example, one worker recounted to the Southern Poverty Law Center that a group of men 
came to his home in Guatemala and threatened to kill him if he did not drop his lawsuit, and 
that his labor recruiter additionally threatened to burn down his entire village.45
“The contractor raised his shirt and 
showed he had a gun — and that 
was enough,” said Eva San Martin, an 
advocate working in New Orleans. “He 
didn’t have to say any more. The 
worker left.” 44 
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Recent years have seen an explosive growth in awareness and acceptance of responsibility 
by multinational companies and other top-tier actors to map and understand inputs to sup-
ply chain production, trace carbon footprints, and in general embrace responsibility for the 
“big picture” of how their goods and services are made and delivered in a globalized econo-
my. Help Wanted makes the case that, in the realm of worker protections, these efforts must 
be further broadened to take account not only of working conditions in supplier factories 
and worksites, but also of the recruitment and hiring practices that precede the employment 
of workers. Indeed, the existing supply chain improvement goals of multinational companies 
will continue to be undermined by problems rooted in recruitment and hiring practices un-
less actions are taken to eliminate them.
Employers, social auditors, worker advocates, labor inspectors and others with an interest in 
preventing human trafficking and slavery must recognize the vulnerability of migrant workers 
to broker-induced forced labor and seek to detect and remediate the hiring abuses that cre-
ate this vulnerability. The red flags discussed above are an excellent place to start. 
In the coming months, Help Wanted will use these red flags as a platform for further action 
to promote the fair hiring of migrant workers in the global economy. Verité will develop an 
open-source toolkit to help companies and others to identify, understand, and respond to 
forced labor in supply-chain production, with a particular focus on direct and indirect hiring 
practices. Workshops will be offered worldwide, at which the findings from Verité’s research 
and the key elements of the toolkit will be presented. Key changes in governmental policy 
and practice needed to reform labor broker practice will be presented in a policy brief. 
Verité’s Help Wanted website, www.verite.org/wellmade will be expanded to serve as 
a clearinghouse of information and resources on the subjects of labor brokerage, human 
trafficking and fair hiring. 
To kick-start the dialogue on transparency in the labor brokerage process, Verité has devel-
oped sets of questions for major stakeholder groups. These questions, found on our web-
site, can serve as a beginning, a way of assessing the degree to which awareness of hiring 
traps is already present and the work left to be done. Verité looks forward to continuing this 
dialogue and working together with interested stakeholders to secure fair hiring for all mi-
grant workers, worldwide. 
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